

I'm Coming Out! How Voter Discrimination Produces Effective LGBTQ Lawmakers

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Abstract

Are LGBTQ legislators effective lawmakers? We build on theories that link voter discrimination to legislative effectiveness (Anzia and Berry 2011) by arguing that voters' biases against LGBTQ candidates narrow the candidate pool, leading to the election of only the most experienced and qualified LGBTQ candidates. As a result of this electoral selection effect, we expect that LGBTQ legislators will be more effective lawmakers than their non-LGBTQ counterparts. To test this hypothesis, we combine data on state legislators' sexual identities (Haider-Markel 2010) with their state legislative effectiveness scores (SLES) from Bucchianeri, Volden, and Wiseman (2024). Our findings reveal that LGBTQ legislators are meaningfully more effective than non-LGBTQ legislators. To link our findings to voter discrimination, we leverage over-time variation in discrimination toward LGBTQ individuals. Across four tests, we consistently find that LGBTQ lawmakers elected in high-discrimination environments are more effective than those elected from less discriminatory environments.

Keywords: LGBTQ politics, representation, legislative effectiveness, state politics, campaigns & elections

Manuscript Type: Short Article

Introduction

In 1974, Elaine Noble was elected to the Massachusetts House of Representatives, becoming the first openly LGBT non-incumbent candidate elected to an American legislature. Throughout her pioneering election, she experienced extreme violence and discrimination from voters because of her sexual identity. In an interview with *Out and Elected in the USA*, Noble recounted protesters breaking windows at her campaign headquarters, destroying her car, and harassing supporters at her campaign office. Despite encountering overt prejudice and violence from some of her constituents, Noble displayed the characteristics of a highly effective lawmaker throughout her two terms in office. She championed issues such as school desegregation and LGBTQ rights and, as a testament to her performance in office, won nearly 80% of the district vote share in the following election (*Secretary of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts* 1974).

During the 50 years since Noble's election, LGBTQ candidates have increasingly run for and won elections to local, state, and federal offices. Although there have been gains in numeric representation, LGBTQ politicians remain underrepresented at all levels of government. While 7.1% of the American population, and 20% of Americans born between 1997 and 2003, identify as LGBTQ, only 13 lawmakers in the 118th Congress identify as lesbian, gay, or bisexual (Jones 2022; Schaeffer 2023). Likewise, only 1.1% of state legislators identify as LGBTQ. The leading explanation for why LGBTQ lawmakers are underrepresented in American legislatures is voter discrimination (Haider-Markel 2010; Magni and Reynolds 2021).

Despite facing discrimination in elections, LGBTQ lawmakers, both at the state and federal levels, have demonstrated a record of effective lawmaking. In the U.S. Congress, LGB lawmakers have persistently championed policies promoting marriage equality and non-discrimination protections. For four consecutive Congresses (114th - 117th), David Cicilline, an openly gay representative from Rhode Island, sponsored the Equality Act. The Equality Act would have enshrined gender and sexuality-based non-discrimination protections into federal law and prohibited discrimination in some public accommodations (Kurtzleben 2021). Though this legislation ultimately died in the Senate, Tammy Baldwin, the first openly lesbian Senator, negotiated a deal with Republican

Senators in the 117th Congress to pass the Respect for Marriage Act. Though narrower in scope than the Equality Act, this bill repealed the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) and requires all states to recognize same-sex marriages that are legally performed in any state (Jalonick 2022). The legislative successes of LGBTQ lawmakers have been even more apparent at the state level. In California, where more than 10% of the upper chamber identifies as LGBTQ, lawmakers have passed legislation aimed at increasing pre-exposure prophylaxis (PrEP) access, promoting economic equality for same-sex couples, and developing anti-discrimination measures and training for employers and LGBTQ youth (EqualityCalifornia 2023).

We argue that the legislative successes of Elaine Noble and other LGBTQ lawmakers are not a coincidence, but rather one result of voter discrimination directed at LGBTQ candidates. In this article, we build on existing theories linking discrimination toward underrepresented groups to their performance in office (Anzia and Berry 2011). We argue that if LGBTQ candidates perceive or experience voter discrimination, only the most qualified and experienced will run for and win elective office. As a result, LGBTQ legislators will be more effective lawmakers than non-LGBTQ legislators. To test our expectations, we identify more than 22,500 state legislators' sexuality identity (Haider-Markel 2010) and pair this with their state legislative effectiveness scores (SLES) (Bucchianeri, Volden and Wiseman 2024).

This article offers two unique contributions to the existing literature on elections and effective lawmaking. First, we analyze an understudied identity group in legislatures—LGBTQ lawmakers. Though a small and growing literature studies LGBTQ politics (Haider-Markel 2010; Hansen and Treul 2015; Brant and Butcher 2022), we still know relatively little about the legislative behavior of LGBTQ lawmakers. Additionally, LGBTQ lawmakers are a good test of our theory given that we are interested in how discrimination in elections is related to lawmakers' performance in office. Recent research suggests that approximately 30% of the American population would oppose an openly gay or lesbian candidate for local, state, and federal office (Haider-Markel, Miller, Flores, Lewis, Tadlock and Taylor 2017). Upwards of 35% of the American population would never vote for a transgender candidate (Haider-Markel et al. 2017), suggesting that discrimination from voters

continues to be a challenge experienced by LGBTQ candidates.

Second, after empirically demonstrating that LGBTQ lawmakers are more effective than non-LGBTQ lawmakers, we conduct a variety of tests linking LGBTQ legislators' policymaking success to voter discrimination. In one test, we construct a novel data set capturing the election year that LGBTQ lawmakers "came out". Unlike observable descriptive identities, such as race and gender, individuals' LGBTQ identity is not immediately obvious. As a result, we can leverage variation in when voters learn that a lawmaker identifies as LGBTQ. This enables us to address a methodological challenge inherent to studies concerning race and gender: *we can measure an LGBTQ legislator's effectiveness before and after they publicly reveal their LGBTQ identity*. Descriptive statistics and model estimates indicate that LGBTQ lawmakers are considerably more effective than non-LGBTQ lawmakers. Publicly out LGBTQ legislators are more effective than LGBTQ legislators who are not publicly out.

How Voter Discrimination Produces Effective LGBTQ Lawmakers

While it is unclear whether LGBTQ candidates face electoral biases in fundraising, party recruitment, or news coverage, they do experience significant discrimination from voters.¹ National and state survey data indicate that approximately 25% of the U.S. adult population is unwilling to support an LGBTQ political candidate (Haider-Markel 2010). Magni and Reynolds (2021) administered a conjoint experiment asking respondents to cast a (fictional) vote for a set of candidates. They then randomize candidates' attributes, including their sexual identity, and find that, on average, LGBT candidates in the United States face a 6.7 percentage point electoral penalty compared to non-LGBTQ candidates.

¹To our knowledge, there is no systematic empirical work examining whether LGBTQ candidates experience other forms of electoral discrimination like fundraising or recruitment biases. Haider-Markel (2010) conducted a survey of all LGBTQ state legislative candidates across 30 states in the 2003-2004 election cycle and found that most LGBTQ candidates reported positive recruitment experiences, little to no discrimination in news coverage of their races, and few hurdles associated with fundraising. To date, no work has used observational data (e.g. fundraising reports, newspaper coverage) to confirm these self-reported accounts. Given that no current work suggests that LGBTQ candidates face discrimination from other electoral actors, we focus our argument on voter discrimination.

We build on Anzia & Berry's (2011) theory of electoral selection and argue that voters' biases toward LGBTQ candidates affect whether LGBTQ individuals run for and win elective office (Anzia and Berry 2011; Ashworth, Berry and Bueno de Mesquita 2023; Lollis 2023). If LGBTQ individuals *perceive* or *experience* discrimination, they will be less likely to run for and win legislative office. This creates a selection effect where only the most experienced and qualified LGBTQ candidates win elections. LGBTQ individuals with less experience or qualifications either never emerge to run or lose their election. As a result, LGBTQ legislators tend to be more experienced and qualified than their non-LGBTQ counterparts, which is one reason they are more effective lawmakers.

Electoral selection effects can occur in two ways. First, if LGBTQ individuals perceive that voters are biased against LGBTQ candidates, they will be less likely to enter the electoral arena. LGBTQ individuals are likely aware that voters may discriminate against them (Wagner 2021). If this is the case, only the most ambitious, qualified, and experienced LGBTQ individuals capable of overcoming voters' biases will emerge to run for office. This suggests that among political candidates, LGBTQ candidates are more ambitious, qualified, and experienced.

Indeed, Haider-Markel (2010; 2020) finds that LGBTQ candidates are more likely than non-LGBTQ candidates to have prior political experience, party work, and be a known figure in their community. LGBTQ candidates are also more likely to run in jurisdictions that are demographically amenable to electing an LGBTQ candidate (Haider-Markel 2010). This evidence indicates that LGBTQ candidates are aware that voters may discriminate against them and, therefore, are strategic about if and where they enter electoral races.

Second, the ambitious, qualified, and experienced LGBTQ candidates who do run for office likely still experience overt discrimination during their elections. This results in an additional selection effect where only the most qualified and experienced LGBTQ candidates win elections. To date, existing work has not examined whether LGBTQ candidates systematically experience disproportionate fundraising challenges, biased news coverage, or neglect from their party compared to non-LGBTQ candidates during their elections. If LGBTQ candidates do experience these forms

of discrimination, there is even more reason to suspect that electoral selection effects result in LGBTQ legislators who are more qualified and experienced. It is clear, however, that LGBTQ candidates face overt discrimination from voters during their campaigns. Magni and Reynolds (2021) find that gay candidates face a six percentage point electoral penalty compared to straight candidates; transgender candidates experience an 11 percentage point penalty compared to cisgender candidates; and Republican and Black LGBTQ candidates face additional penalties compared to their Democratic and white LGBTQ counterparts.

Our theory suggests that regardless of whether LGBTQ candidates perceive or experience discrimination during elections, the result is the same: if elected, LGBTQ lawmakers will be more experienced and qualified than their non-LGBTQ colleagues. As a result, we expect that LGBTQ legislators will outperform non-LGBTQ legislators in various ways. Anzia and Berry (2011) test legislators' performance by examining the amount of federal spending legislators secure for their districts. We operationalize legislators' performance in office by examining their legislative effectiveness, specifically, their ability to get their sponsored legislation passed into law.

Importantly, our argument suggests that candidate selection, not survival, explains why LGBTQ lawmakers are more effective than non-LGBTQ lawmakers. Our theory posits that LGBTQ lawmakers are more effective than non-LGBTQ lawmakers because they have to be more qualified and experienced to win their elections (i.e. selection). A competing explanation could be that LGBTQ legislators combat voter discrimination in upcoming elections by engaging in effective lawmaking (i.e. survival). We suspect that LGBTQ lawmakers' effectiveness primarily stems from selection rather than survival for two reasons. First, existing evidence finds that LGBTQ candidates are more qualified and experienced than non-LGBTQ candidates (Haider-Markel 2010; Haider-Markel et al. 2020). If candidate quality is correlated with legislative performance (Anzia and Berry 2011), LGBTQ lawmakers would be more effective than non-LGBTQ lawmakers. Second, evidence from survey experiments suggests that voters do not know whether their representative is an effective lawmaker (Butler, Hughes, Volden and Wiseman 2023). As a result, effective lawmaking is not the

most strategic way to survive a reelection campaign.²

H1 (LGBTQ Legislative Effectiveness): LGBTQ legislators are more effective lawmakers than non-LGBTQ legislators.

Does voter discrimination explain LGBTQ lawmakers' effectiveness? To link our findings to voter discrimination, we leverage variation in the intensity of voter discrimination across four different tests. If LGBTQ lawmakers are more effective when elected from high-discrimination environments, we can be more confident that LGBTQ lawmakers' effectiveness stems from electoral selection effects. No test alone confirms that voter discrimination *causes* LGBTQ lawmakers' effectiveness; however, leveraging variation in discrimination across four tests collectively builds evidence that voter discrimination is at least one factor contributing to LGBTQ lawmakers' effectiveness.

First, we argue that if voter discrimination is one cause of LGBTQ lawmakers' effectiveness, we should expect publicly out LGBTQ lawmakers to be more effective than those who are not yet out. Since non-out LGBTQ lawmakers have not disclosed their identity to voters, there is little reason to suspect that they would face voter discrimination. If voter discrimination is responsible for producing effective lawmaking, we should observe a "coming out" boost in LGBTQ lawmakers' effectiveness. It may be the case that LGBTQ lawmakers who are not publicly out are more effective than non-LGBTQ lawmakers because they know that LGBTQ individuals face discrimination (which could also be a reason why they have not yet come out). If LGBTQ lawmakers experience an additional boost in effectiveness after coming out, despite already being more effective than

²In the appendix, we provide evidence suggesting that survival is not the mechanism explaining our findings. We regress a lawmaker's effectiveness score on their vote share in their upcoming election. For survival to explain our results, effective lawmaking should lead to a higher vote share *and* LGBTQ lawmakers should benefit electorally from effective lawmaking more than non-LGBTQ lawmakers. In contrast, we find that vote share is unrelated to effective lawmaking. Effective lawmaking does not lead to a higher vote share in lawmakers' upcoming elections. This is true for both LGBTQ and non-LGBTQ lawmakers. Ultimately we cannot rule this alternative mechanism out, however, results from this model and existing literature suggest that candidate selection is likely the primary mechanism explaining our results.

their non-LGBTQ counterparts, voters' awareness of their LGBTQ identity is likely driving the boost in effective lawmaking.

Second, discrimination toward LGBTQ individuals varies by state. LGBTQ candidates are more likely to face discrimination in Republican dominated states than in Democratic dominated states (Haider-Markel 2010; Magni and Reynolds 2021). As a result, if voter discrimination drives effective lawmaking, LGBTQ legislators elected in deep red states (e.g. Idaho, North Dakota, Wyoming) should be more effective than LGBTQ legislators elected in solid blue states (e.g. California, Massachusetts, Vermont).

Third, discrimination toward LGBTQ individuals has varied over time. In 1996, only 27% of the American public supported the legalization of same-sex marriage, whereas by 2023, over 70% indicated support (Mccarthy 2023). We use this evolving public opinion to test whether LGBTQ lawmakers were more effective during periods of higher discrimination. We expect that LGBTQ lawmakers were more effective before the Supreme Court's ruling in *Obergefell v. Hodges* (2015), which guaranteed the constitutional right to marry for all same-sex couples. By the time of the *Obergefell* ruling, public opinion on LGBTQ rights had evolved significantly, making it a reasonable cut point for our analysis. If voter discrimination explains LGBTQ lawmakers' effectiveness, those elected before the ruling should be more effective than those elected afterward. Furthermore, if discrimination drives effectiveness, LGBTQ lawmakers elected in recent decades should be less effective than those elected in the 1990s and 2000s.

Fourth, in some state legislative districts, voters have elected more than one publicly out LGBTQ lawmaker. We expect that voters will be most intolerant toward the first LGBTQ lawmaker elected from a district. As a result, subsequent lawmakers will experience less discrimination. If discrimination fosters effective lawmaking, out LGBTQ lawmakers who are not the first LGBTQ lawmaker to be elected from their district should be less effective than LGBTQ lawmakers who are the first to be elected by their district.³

³Importantly, in each of these tests we always expect LGBTQ lawmakers to be more effective than non-LGBTQ lawmakers. The prior tests predict that variation *within* LGBTQ lawmakers' effectiveness is explained by varying levels of voter discrimination.

H2 (Voter Discrimination Tests):

- Out LGBTQ lawmakers are more effective than non-out LGBTQ lawmakers.
- LGBTQ lawmakers elected from red states are more effective than LGBTQ lawmakers elected from blue states.
- LGBTQ lawmakers elected after *Obergefell* are less effective than LGBTQ lawmakers elected prior to the ruling. And LGBTQ lawmakers elected in recent decades are less effective than LGBTQ lawmakers elected in the 1990s and 2000s.
- Publicly out LGBTQ lawmakers who are not the first LGBTQ lawmaker to be elected from their district are less effective than LGBTQ lawmakers who are the first to be elected by their district.

Data & Methods

To test our hypotheses, we pair data on state legislators' LGBTQ identity for more than 22,500 unique state legislators (Haider-Markel 2010) with Bucchianeri, Volden, and Wiseman's (2024) state legislative effectiveness scores (SLES). The data set includes SLES for 80,344 legislator-term-specific observations for 49 states from 1987 to 2017. Of these observations, 946 (or 1.1% of our sample) identify as LGBTQ.⁴

SLES captures the weighted average of a legislator's actions throughout five stages of the law-making process: bill introduction (BILL), action in committee (AIC), action beyond committee (ABC), passing one chamber (PASS), and becoming law (LAW) (Bucchianeri, Volden and Wiseman 2024). Therefore, these scores evaluate effectiveness throughout the entirety of the legislative process rather than only considering final passage votes. Additionally, SLES are weighted to reflect the substance and significance of legislation. Commemorative and substantive legislation influences a legislator's effectiveness score less than substantive and significant legislation.⁵

⁴Of LGBTQ lawmakers, 11% (101) were not out during at least one election during our time series. 81% (771) of LGBTQ lawmakers have been out since their first election.

⁵See section 1 of the Appendix for more information about how SLES are calculated.

The primary independent variable, “LGBTQ,” is a dichotomous variable coded as 1 if a legislator identifies as lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, or queer (LGBTQ). We use Haider-Markel’s (2010; 2020) dataset to code state legislators’ LGBTQ identities, which includes every LGBTQ state legislator elected from 1975 to the present. Additionally, we construct a novel dataset indicating the election year that LGBTQ lawmakers publicly came out. From this dataset, we create a dichotomous variable, “Out During Election,” that indicates whether a legislator was out during each legislative term.⁶ Finally, for each test related to our second hypothesis, we create a series of binary variables: “Red State” takes on the value of 1 if a legislator is from a state where less than 40% of the state voted for the Democratic presidential nominee; “Blue State” is coded as 1 if a legislator is from a state where more than 60% of the state voted for the Democratic presidential nominee; “Pre-Obergefell” is coded as 1 if a legislator ran in an election prior to the 2015 Supreme Court decision, and “Not First LGBTQ from District” takes on the value of 1 if the legislator is not the first LGBTQ lawmaker elected from their district.

We condition on several covariates that likely influence legislators’ effectiveness including demographic and chamber controls (Volden and Wiseman 2014; Bucchianeri, Volden and Wiseman 2024). We also control for the percentage of LGBTQ- and out-LGBTQ legislators within a given state, term, and chamber to ensure that the estimated relationship persists regardless of how many (out) LGBTQ lawmakers are in a legislature. Finally, we include various arrangements of state, term, district, and legislator fixed effects to control for variation specific to each state legislature, term, district, and legislator.⁷

Results

To predict the relationship between legislators’ LGBTQ identity and their legislative effectiveness, we estimate an OLS regression model with state, term, and district fixed effects that includes clustered standard errors.⁸ Figure 1 displays the results from this regression model, with SLES


⁶See section 3 of the Appendix for more information about data collection and measurement of the Out variable.

⁷Descriptive statistics for the variables of interest are presented in Appendix A.2.

⁸The mean SLES for LGBTQ lawmakers is 0.16, while the mean SLES for their non-LGBTQ colleagues is -0.002. This initial descriptive analysis supports our expectation that LGBTQ legislators are more effective lawmakers than their non-LGBTQ counterparts.

as the dependent variable and LGBTQ as the independent variable.⁹ The model shows that, all else equal, LGBTQ lawmakers have an effectiveness score 0.27 units higher than non-LGBTQ lawmakers elected from the same district ($p < 0.001$). To contextualize this finding, the effectiveness boost for LGBTQ lawmakers is nearly as large as the effectiveness advantage associated with being in the majority party (0.32) and is comparable to the effectiveness boost associated with 10 additional terms of seniority.

Figure 1: LGBTQ Legislators are More Effective Lawmakers



Note: Dots indicate coefficients estimated from an OLS regression found in Table 4.1 (in the appendix). Estimated with 95% confidence intervals. Model includes state, term, and district fixed effects.

⁹Full model details are reported in Table 4.1 in the appendix.

Does voter discrimination produce effective lawmaking?


To test whether voter discrimination explains LGBTQ lawmakers' effectiveness, we analyze variation in LGBTQ lawmakers' effectiveness based on (1) whether they are out, (2) whether they were elected from a red or blue state, (3) the time period they ran for office, and (4) whether they are the first LGBTQ lawmaker elected from their district. If voter discrimination accounts for differences in effectiveness, we would expect to observe the following: Out LGBTQ lawmakers should be more effective than LGBTQ lawmakers who are not out; LGBTQ lawmakers elected from red states should be more effective than those elected from blue states; lawmakers elected more recently should be less effective than those elected in earlier periods; and LGBTQ lawmakers who are not the first to be elected from their district should be less effective than the first LGBTQ lawmaker from their district.

Figure 2 presents the results for the "Out" test.¹⁰ We estimate an OLS regression model with clustered standard errors, including state and term fixed effects.¹¹ We regress SLES onto the variable "Out During Election," our independent variable of interest. The coefficient for Out During Election is 0.44 ($p < 0.01$), indicating that publicly out LGBTQ lawmakers have an effectiveness score 0.44 units higher than their non-publicly out counterparts. Substantively, this suggests that an out LGBTQ legislator's effectiveness is comparable to that of a committee chair. The coefficient for Out During Election is the largest covariate in the model, apart from majority party status.

¹⁰The full results are reported in Table 4.2 in the appendix.

¹¹Non-LGBTQ lawmakers have a mean SLES of -0.002. LGBTQ lawmakers who are not publicly out have a mean SLES of -0.162, while publicly out LGBTQ lawmakers have a mean SLES of 0.2. This suggests that when LGBTQ lawmakers publicly reveal their sexual identity, their mean SLES increases by 0.362. Descriptively, this indicates that out-LGBTQ lawmakers are more effective than those who are not publicly out.

Figure 2: Out Legislators Are More Effective Lawmakers




Note: Dots indicate coefficients estimated from an OLS regression found in Table 4.2 (in the appendix). Estimated with 95% confidence intervals. Model includes state and term fixed effects.

Figure 3 reports the results for the red and blue state test.¹² Using an OLS regression model, we regress our LGBTQ variable onto SLES and subset the data by whether the legislator was elected from a red state or a blue state. The model includes clustered standard errors and state and term fixed effects. The coefficient for red state LGBTQ lawmakers is 0.42 ($p < 0.05$), while the coefficient for blue state LGBTQ lawmakers is 0.14 and is not statistically significant. This suggests that LGBTQ lawmakers elected from red states—where voter discrimination toward LGBTQ candidates is more prevalent—are meaningfully more effective than non-LGBTQ lawmakers elected from red states. LGBTQ lawmakers elected from blue states, however, are no more or less effective

¹²The full results are reported in Table 4.3 in the appendix.

than non-LGBTQ lawmakers in blue states.

Figure 3: LGBTQ Legislators From Red States Are More Effective Lawmakers



Note: Dots indicate coefficients estimated from an OLS regression found in Table 4.3 (in the appendix). Estimated with 95% confidence intervals. Model includes state and term fixed effects. The red coefficients are LGBTQ lawmakers from red states (i.e. Arkansas, Idaho, Kentucky, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Utah, West Virginia, and Wyoming). The blue coefficients are LGBTQ lawmakers from blue states (i.e. California, Hawaii, Massachusetts, New York, and Vermont).

The coefficients estimated for the *Obergefell*, time, and replacement tests are included in Table 1. The dependent variable in column 1 is the SLES of LGBTQ lawmakers and the independent variable is a binary variable coded 1 if the lawmaker was elected prior to the *Obergefell* ruling. The coefficient is 2.32 ($p < 0.001$), suggesting that LGBTQ lawmakers elected prior to the *Obergefell* ruling have a legislative effectiveness score that is 2.32 units higher than LGBTQ lawmakers

elected after the ruling. Columns 2-4 display the results from the time period test, where the dependent variable is lawmakers' SLES if they were serving in the 1980s-1990s (column 2), 1990s-2000s (column 3), or 2010-2018 (column 4). All coefficients on the LGBTQ variable are positive and significant, suggesting that LGBTQ lawmakers are more effective than non-LGBTQ lawmakers. As predicted, the coefficient is largest for the 1980-1990s time period (0.394, $p < 0.05$), smaller for the 2000s time period (0.312, $p < 0.001$), and the smallest for the most recent time period (0.205, $p < 0.01$).

Finally, column 5 of Table 1 estimates the relationship between LGBTQ lawmakers' SLES and a binary variable coded 1 if the lawmaker is *not* the first LGBTQ lawmaker elected from a district. As expected, the coefficient is negative and statistically significant, suggesting that LGBTQ lawmakers who are not the first elected from their district have an effectiveness score 0.26 units ($p < 0.1$) lower than the first LGBTQ lawmaker elected from a district. Again, no single mechanism test that we offer is conclusive. Collectively, however, we leverage variation in voter discrimination in four unique ways, and across each of the four tests the finding is consistent—when LGBTQ lawmakers experience or perceive more discrimination from voters, they are more effective lawmakers.¹³ To assess the robustness of our findings, we also examine whether LGBTQ lawmakers outperform non-LGBTQ lawmakers in areas beyond effective lawmaking. The full results are reported in section 7 of the appendix. We find that LGBTQ lawmakers raise more money in their elections (Bonica 2023), are more likely to be committee chairs (Bucchianeri, Volden and Wiseman 2024), and introduce more substantive and significant legislation than their non-LGBTQ counterparts (Bucchianeri, Volden and Wiseman 2024).

¹³One additional test is provided in section 6 of the appendix, but was omitted from the main text due to space limitations.

Table 1: Obergefell, Time Period, and Replacement Tests

	Pre-Obergefell	1980s-90s	2000s	2010-2018	Out (SLES)
Pre-Obergefell	2.320*** (0.156)				
LGBTQ		0.394* (0.186)	0.312*** (0.088)	0.205** (0.064)	
Not First Out LGBTQ from District					-0.264+ (0.157)
% LGBTQ	-0.016 (0.022)	0.027* (0.011)	0.009+ (0.005)	0.012** (0.004)	
% Out					-0.011 (0.028)
Female	-0.091 (0.117)	0.007 (0.024)	-0.008 (0.017)	-0.014 (0.019)	-0.095 (0.122)
Black	0.065 (0.257)	0.119 (0.107)	-0.045 (0.109)	0.055 (0.087)	0.240 (0.313)
Hispanic	0.383 (0.292)	0.180+ (0.108)	0.108 (0.109)	0.099 (0.083)	0.664+ (0.366)
White	0.383+ (0.213)	0.201+ (0.086)	0.136 (0.101)	0.069 (0.072)	0.636* (0.284)
Democrat	0.161 (0.266)	0.005 (0.022)	0.006 (0.015)	0.062*** (0.017)	0.320 (0.316)
Seniority	0.074* (0.034)	0.029*** (0.005)	0.028*** (0.004)	0.027*** (0.004)	0.072* (0.034)
Committee Chair	0.347* (0.146)	0.622*** (0.031)	0.500*** (0.021)	0.474*** (0.023)	0.412** (0.158)
In Majority	0.816*** (0.183)	0.267*** (0.026)	0.368*** (0.022)	0.420*** (0.026)	0.750*** (0.200)
In Governor's Party	-0.006 (0.111)	0.080*** (0.019)	0.024+ (0.013)	0.034* (0.016)	0.009 (0.117)
In Majority Leadership	-0.037 (0.266)	0.236** (0.075)	0.171*** (0.043)	0.107+ (0.056)	-0.091 (0.285)
In Minority Leadership	-0.182 (0.238)	0.098+ (0.055)	0.057 (0.036)	0.131** (0.050)	-0.387 (0.252)
Distance from Median	0.013 (0.108)	-0.163*** (0.026)	-0.167*** (0.020)	-0.100*** (0.018)	-0.007 (0.114)
Leader, Speaker, President	-0.160 (0.387)	0.012 (0.125)	0.016 (0.087)	0.014 (0.109)	-0.096 (0.405)
Term Limits	0.363** (0.134)	0.096* (0.038)	0.100*** (0.018)	0.078*** (0.019)	0.339* (0.147)
Professionalism	-0.281 (0.362)	-0.176* (0.081)	-0.206*** (0.059)	-0.117 (0.081)	-0.191 (0.398)
Vote Share	-0.366+ (0.208)	0.039 (0.045)	0.005 (0.031)	-0.034 (0.035)	-0.420* (0.205)
Senate	-0.255* (0.112)	-0.193*** (0.028)	-0.165*** (0.018)	-0.137*** (0.020)	-0.252* (0.110)
Intercept	-0.870* (0.386)	-0.548*** (0.105)	-0.487*** (0.107)	-0.529*** (0.089)	-0.924 (0.659)
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Term Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	865	15388	31536	24745	770

Standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Conclusion

We provide a novel empirical test of Anzia & Berry's (2011) argument by demonstrating that voter discrimination produces effective LGBTQ lawmakers. We conduct four mechanism tests, all of which support our expectation that voter discrimination is driving LGBTQ lawmakers' effectiveness. Studying the legislative performance of LGBTQ lawmakers is important for at least two reasons. First, while voters likely discriminate against LGBTQ candidates for many reasons, one plausible explanation is that voters suspect that LGBTQ lawmakers will be bad at their job. Our findings suggest exactly the opposite—LGBTQ legislators are more effective lawmakers than non-LGBTQ legislators. Second, if the descriptive representation of an identity group improves substantive representation, our findings suggest that LGBTQ lawmakers have the legislative tools and skills necessary to substantively represent LGBTQ Americans.

Given that LGBTQ lawmakers win as often and legislate as well, what factors explain their numeric underrepresentation in legislatures? We highlight two potential causes of LGBTQ underrepresentation that scholars should empirically evaluate. First, LGBTQ Americans may be less likely than non-LGBTQ Americans to consider running for political office (Fox and Lawless 2004). If a sexuality-based political ambition gap exists, it could be the case that, though they are equally as qualified, LGBTQ Americans do not consider running for office. Second, political gatekeepers (political parties, activists, politicians) may be less likely to recruit LGBTQ candidates, despite being qualified for the job (Fox and Lawless 2010). Presenting empirical evidence demonstrating that LGBTQ lawmakers are capable of winning elections and effectively legislating is necessary to dismiss discriminatory arguments that LGBTQ candidates are in some way less capable than other candidates. Identifying the cause(s) of LGBTQ underrepresentation—whether it be a lack of political ambition, political recruitment, or some other factor—is necessary to increase LGBTQ representation in American politics.

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1 Computing State Legislative Effectiveness Scores

State Legislative Effectiveness Scores (SLES) are weighted averages calculated for individual legislators (i) in each legislative term (t) within each legislative chamber. SLES consider the number of bills a legislator (i) introduced (BILL), received action in committee (AIC), received action beyond committee (ABC), passed their chamber (PASS), and became law (LAW) (Bucchianeri et al. 2020, p.6). Each bill is weighted by its overall significance. Commemorative bills are weighed $\alpha=1$, substantive bills are weighed $\beta=5$, and substantive/significant bills are weighed $\gamma=10$.

Finally, this equation is normalized ($n/5$) across N legislators to ensure SLES takes a mean value of 1 for each chamber (Bucchianeri et al. 2020, p. 6). We z-score the SLES variable to produce a normal distribution with a mean of zero.

SLES for four states appear in the data set post-2003: Massachusetts (2009), Nebraska (2007), Oregon (2007), and Rhode Island (2007). SLES do not exist for Kansas due to insufficient data.

The equation below explains how SLES scores are calculated. For a more detailed description of how legislative effectiveness scores are calculated see Volden & Wiseman (2014), and for more information on state legislative effectiveness scores see Bucchianeri et al. (2020).

$$SLES_{it} = \left[\begin{array}{l}
\frac{\alpha BILL_{it}^C + \beta BILL_{it}^S + \gamma BILL_{it}^{SS}}{\alpha \sum_{j=1}^N BILL_{it}^C + \beta \sum_{j=1}^N BILL_{it}^S + \gamma \sum_{j=1}^N BILL_{it}^{SS}} \\
+ \frac{\alpha AIC_{it}^C + \beta AIC_{it}^S + \gamma AIC_{it}^{SS}}{\alpha \sum_{j=1}^N AIC_{it}^C + \beta \sum_{j=1}^N AIC_{it}^S + \gamma \sum_{j=1}^N AIC_{it}^{SS}} \\
+ \frac{\alpha ABC_{it}^C + \beta ABC_{it}^S + \gamma ABC_{it}^{SS}}{\alpha \sum_{j=1}^N ABC_{it}^C + \beta \sum_{j=1}^N ABC_{it}^S + \gamma \sum_{j=1}^N ABC_{it}^{SS}} \\
+ \frac{\alpha PASS_{it}^C + \beta PASS_{it}^S + \gamma PASS_{it}^{SS}}{\alpha \sum_{j=1}^N PASS_{it}^C + \beta \sum_{j=1}^N PASS_{it}^S + \gamma \sum_{j=1}^N PASS_{it}^{SS}} \\
+ \frac{\alpha LAW_{it}^C + \beta LAW_{it}^S + \gamma LAW_{it}^{SS}}{\alpha \sum_{j=1}^N LAW_{it}^C + \beta \sum_{j=1}^N LAW_{it}^S + \gamma \sum_{j=1}^N LAW_{it}^{SS}}
\end{array} \right] \left[\frac{N}{5} \right]$$

Note: Equation from Bucchinaeri et al. 2020 (p.6)


2 Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Deviation	Range
LGBTQ	0.012	0.11	0 – 1
Percent LGBTQ	1.2	1.6	0 – 15
Out During Election	0.89	0.31	0 – 1
Percent Out During Election	1.1	1.5	0 – 14
Red State	0.15	0.36	0 – 1
Blue State	0.10	0.31	0 – 1
Pre-Obergefell	0.74	0.44	0 – 1
Not First LGBTQ Seatholder	0.0008	0.03	0 – 1
Bill Introductions (BILL)	0.013	0.015	0 – 0.31
Action in Committee (AIC)	0.013	0.017	0 – 0.39
Action Beyond Committee (ABC)	0.013	0.018	0 – 0.44
Pass Chamber (PASS)	0.013	0.018	0 – 0.49
Becomes Law (LAW)	0.013	0.019	0 – 0.55
SLES _z	0	0.99	-2.9 – 14

3 Measuring Out During Election

We leverage the election cycle that LGBTQ lawmakers “come out” (i.e. reveal their LGBTQ identity to voters) as a test of our voter discrimination theory. If voter discrimination drives effective lawmaking, Out LGBTQ lawmakers should be more effective than non-Out LGBTQ lawmakers. Said differently, voters should not electorally penalize an LGBTQ lawmaker who has not yet come out. To test whether Out LGBTQ lawmakers are more effective than non-Out LGBTQ lawmakers, we create a novel data set capturing the election year that LGBTQ lawmakers publicly come out. To do this, we use and update Haider-Markel’s (2010) data on LGBTQ state lawmakers. We google search all 262 LGBTQ state lawmakers in our data set and use a variety of resources to determine when the lawmaker came out. We create a new variable “Out During Election” and, given that our data is at the legislator-term level, code the specific term that each LGBTQ lawmaker comes out. If an LGBTQ lawmaker was out in their first election, “Out During Election” is coded 1 for all legislator-term observations. For lawmakers who come out in office, this variable allows us to isolate LGBTQ lawmakers’ effectiveness in the election cycles prior to coming out, and the election cycles after.

To give a specific example of how our coding scheme operates, we describe our coding decision for State Senator Karen Peterson, an openly lesbian legislator from Delaware. Senator Peterson was elected to the Delaware State Senate in 2002. At the time, she was not publicly out. In 2013, when debating a marriage equality bill, Senator Peterson publicly revealed that she identifies as a Lesbian on the Senate floor. HuffPost published an article the next day titled “Karen Peterson, Delaware State Senator, Comes Out During Gay Marriage Debate” and the Victory Fund, a PAC that supports LGBTQ candidates, and the Human Rights Campaign tweeted about her floor speech. In this case, all term observations prior to 2013 were coded as “Out During Election = 0”, and all term observations after 2013 were coded as “Out During Election = 1”.



Note: HuffPost article describing Senator Peterson coming out on Senate floor (May 7, 2013. Author: Paige Lavender).

We relied on three main sources to determine the election cycle that LGBTQ lawmakers came out: (1) LGBTQ organizations and PACs that endorse LGBTQ candidates, (2) newspapers, and (3) legislator biographies. The Victory Fund is a PAC that endorses and financially supports LGBTQ candidates. They post a profile of each lawmaking they endorse, which often includes information about the lawmaker's LGBTQ identity and when they came out (particularly if it was after they initially ran for elective office). Newspapers were our most utilized source. We searched for local news articles with two search terms: "LAWMAKERS NAME", and "CAME OUT". These often yielded a local news article describing the specific day that the LGBTQ lawmaker publicly came out. Finally, in some cases, LGBTQ lawmakers include information about when they came out in their personal biography (often on the legislature's website).

4 Models (In-Text Plots)

4.1 Table 4.1: LGBTQ Legislators Are More Effective Lawmakers

	BILL	AIC	ABC	PASS	LAW	SLES	SLES
LGBTQ	0.001* (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.262*** (0.061)	0.271*** (0.060)
% LGBTQ	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.012*** (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)
Female	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000+ (0.000)	0.000* (0.000)	-0.010 (0.013)	-0.019 (0.013)
Black	-0.005* (0.002)	-0.006* (0.002)	-0.006* (0.003)	-0.006* (0.003)	-0.006+ (0.004)	0.002 (0.078)	-0.050 (0.074)
Hispanic	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.004+ (0.002)	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.004)	0.106 (0.077)	0.032 (0.073)
Race (Other)	-0.005* (0.003)	-0.005+ (0.003)	-0.006* (0.003)	-0.008** (0.003)	-0.008* (0.004)	-0.161 (0.100)	-0.188+ (0.096)
White	-0.004+ (0.002)	-0.005+ (0.002)	-0.004+ (0.003)	-0.005 (0.003)	-0.005 (0.004)	0.112 (0.071)	0.064 (0.066)
Democrat	-0.001** (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000+ (0.000)	0.001+ (0.000)	0.030* (0.012)	0.012 (0.012)
Seniority	0.000* (0.000)	0.000+ (0.000)	0.000+ (0.000)	0.000* (0.000)	0.000* (0.000)	0.028*** (0.003)	0.027*** (0.003)
Committee Chair	0.006*** (0.000)	0.008*** (0.000)	0.008*** (0.000)	0.009*** (0.000)	0.009*** (0.000)	0.519*** (0.016)	0.524*** (0.016)
In Majority Party	0.002*** (0.000)	0.004*** (0.000)	0.004*** (0.000)	0.004*** (0.000)	0.004*** (0.000)	0.351*** (0.016)	0.328*** (0.018)
In Governor's Party	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.042*** (0.009)	0.042*** (0.009)
In Majority Leadership	0.003*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.005*** (0.001)	0.006*** (0.001)	0.006*** (0.001)	0.170*** (0.033)	0.174*** (0.033)
In Minority Leadership	0.002*** (0.001)	0.001+ (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.079** (0.030)	0.091** (0.030)
Distance from Median	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.002*** (0.000)	-0.002*** (0.000)	-0.003*** (0.000)	-0.146*** (0.014)	-0.189*** (0.016)
Leader, Speaker, or President	0.002 (0.001)	0.003+ (0.002)	0.004* (0.002)	0.004* (0.002)	0.005* (0.002)	0.015 (0.072)	0.022 (0.075)
Term Limits	0.002*** (0.000)	0.002*** (0.000)	0.002*** (0.000)	0.002*** (0.000)	0.002*** (0.000)	0.100*** (0.014)	0.071** (0.024)
Professionalism	-0.005*** (0.001)	-0.005*** (0.001)	-0.005*** (0.001)	-0.005*** (0.001)	-0.005*** (0.001)	-0.175*** (0.049)	0.043 (0.116)
Vote Share	0.002*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.002*** (0.000)	0.002*** (0.000)	0.002*** (0.000)	0.005 (0.024)	0.091*** (0.027)
Senate	0.015*** (0.000)	0.014*** (0.000)	0.014*** (0.000)	0.014*** (0.000)	0.014*** (0.000)	-0.162*** (0.014)	-0.152*** (0.016)
Intercept	0.008*** (0.002)	0.007** (0.002)	0.006* (0.003)	0.006* (0.003)	0.006+ (0.004)	-0.467*** (0.085)	-0.590*** (0.107)
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Term Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
District Fixed Effects							✓
Observations	73483	73483	73483	73483	73483	73483	72708

Standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

4.2 Table 4.2: Out Legislators Are More Effective Lawmakers

	BILL	AIC	ABC	PASS	LAW	SLES	SLES
Out During Election	-0.005 ⁺ (0.003)	0.000 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.436 ^{**} (0.138)	0.208 (0.146)
% Out	0.001 ⁺ (0.000)	0.001 (0.000)	0.001 (0.000)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.006 (0.025)	
Female	0.000 (0.001)	0.002 (0.001)	0.002 (0.001)	0.002 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.100 (0.116)	
Black	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.009 ⁺ (0.005)	-0.008 (0.005)	-0.012 [*] (0.005)	-0.016 ^{**} (0.006)	-0.348 (0.281)	
Hispanic	0.001 (0.005)	-0.006 (0.005)	-0.005 (0.005)	-0.010 ⁺ (0.005)	-0.011 [*] (0.006)	0.050 (0.282)	
White	0.000 (0.004)	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.009 [*] (0.004)	-0.010 [*] (0.005)	0.035 (0.223)	
Democrat	0.002 (0.004)	0.003 (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.255 (0.246)	
Seniority	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.072 ⁺ (0.034)	
Committee Chair	0.004 ⁺ (0.002)	0.007 ^{**} (0.002)	0.007 ^{***} (0.002)	0.006 ^{**} (0.002)	0.006 ^{**} (0.002)	0.379 ^{**} (0.144)	
In Majority Party	0.005 ^{**} (0.002)	0.008 ^{***} (0.002)	0.009 ^{***} (0.002)	0.010 ^{***} (0.002)	0.010 ^{***} (0.002)	0.730 ^{***} (0.187)	
In Governor's Party	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.006 (0.108)	
In Majority Leadership	0.004 (0.004)	0.006 (0.005)	0.006 (0.005)	0.009 (0.006)	0.008 (0.006)	-0.097 (0.268)	
In Minority Leadership	-0.002 (0.003)	0.000 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	-0.000 (0.003)	0.000 (0.003)	-0.118 (0.259)	
Distance from Median	0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.017 (0.109)	
Leader, Speaker, or President	-0.009 ⁺ (0.005)	-0.007 (0.005)	-0.005 (0.006)	-0.004 (0.007)	-0.003 (0.008)	-0.124 (0.387)	
Term Limits	0.005 ^{**} (0.002)	0.005 ^{**} (0.002)	0.005 ^{**} (0.002)	0.006 ^{**} (0.002)	0.006 ^{**} (0.002)	0.334 ⁺ (0.136)	
Professionalism	-0.010 ⁺ (0.005)	-0.015 ^{**} (0.005)	-0.014 ^{**} (0.005)	-0.010 ⁺ (0.005)	-0.010 ⁺ (0.005)	-0.205 (0.354)	
Vote Share	0.004 (0.003)	0.002 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	-0.298 (0.200)	
Senate	0.014 ^{***} (0.002)	0.013 ^{***} (0.002)	0.011 ^{***} (0.002)	0.011 ^{***} (0.002)	0.011 ^{***} (0.002)	-0.259 [*] (0.108)	
Intercept	0.002 (0.005)	0.011 ^{**} (0.004)	0.009 [*] (0.004)	0.016 ^{**} (0.005)	0.020 ^{***} (0.005)	1.725 ^{***} (0.349)	-0.496 (0.476)
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
Term Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
Legislator Fixed Effects							✓
Observations	865	865	865	865	865	865	946

Standard errors in parentheses

⁺ $p < 0.1$, ^{*} $p < 0.05$, ^{**} $p < 0.01$, ^{***} $p < 0.001$

4.3 Table 4.3: LGBTQ Legislators in Red States Are More Effective Law-makers


	Red State (SLES)	Red State (SLES)	Blue State (SLES)	Blue State (SLES)
LGBTQ	0.419* (0.186)	0.369* (0.187)	0.138 (0.092)	0.173+ (0.097)
% LGBTQ	0.014 (0.015)	0.013 (0.015)	-0.013 (0.009)	-0.016 (0.012)
Female	0.028 (0.033)	0.026 (0.033)	-0.009 (0.040)	-0.017 (0.040)
Black	-0.156 (0.262)	-0.167 (0.266)	0.075 (0.158)	0.075 (0.145)
Hispanic	-0.098 (0.250)	-0.095 (0.254)	-0.112 (0.111)	-0.090 (0.117)
Race (other)	-0.350 (0.257)	-0.375 (0.266)	-0.221+ (0.133)	-0.122 (0.155)
White	-0.151 (0.239)	-0.133 (0.242)	0.145 (0.097)	0.172+ (0.102)
Democrat	-0.059+ (0.031)	-0.053+ (0.032)	0.228*** (0.055)	0.300*** (0.057)
Seniority	0.021*** (0.006)	0.021*** (0.005)	0.043*** (0.007)	0.040*** (0.007)
Committee Chair	0.457*** (0.034)	0.452*** (0.034)	0.608*** (0.056)	0.618*** (0.059)
In Majority	0.279*** (0.038)	0.264*** (0.038)	0.492*** (0.064)	0.570*** (0.064)
In Governor's Party	0.032 (0.026)	0.035 (0.027)	0.088*** (0.024)	0.085** (0.026)
In Majority Leadership	0.363*** (0.084)	0.336*** (0.080)	0.040 (0.063)	0.049 (0.064)
In Minority Leadership	0.164*** (0.049)	0.160** (0.052)	0.243* (0.095)	0.280** (0.094)
Distance from Median	-0.166*** (0.039)	-0.166*** (0.040)	-0.201*** (0.042)	-0.201*** (0.041)
Leader, Speaker, or President	-0.284* (0.131)	-0.254+ (0.135)	0.334+ (0.197)	0.448* (0.207)
Vote Share	0.212*** (0.056)	0.225*** (0.056)	-0.093 (0.085)	-0.066 (0.086)
Term Limits	0.029 (0.079)	0.027 (0.079)	0.228 (0.145)	0.156 (0.167)
Professionalism	1.787+ (1.009)	1.792+ (1.028)	-0.038 (0.262)	0.054 (0.267)
Senate	-0.141*** (0.031)	-0.148*** (0.035)	-0.171*** (0.042)	-0.131** (0.046)
Intercept	-0.699+ (0.370)	-0.813* (0.393)	-0.752*** (0.181)	-0.891*** (0.185)
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Term Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
District Fixed Effects		✓		✓
Observations	11008	10849	7327	6883

Standard errors in parentheses


+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

5 Additional Figures

5.1 Figure 5.1: Overtime Trends in LGBTQ Lawmakers Being Out for All of Their Legislative Tenure: 1991-2017




5.2 Figure 5.2: Overtime Trends in % LGBTQ and % Out Lawmakers Across State Legislatures: 1987-2018




Note: The maps above display the percentage of LGBTQ and Out LGBTQ lawmakers in each state legislature and time period. SLES scores are not available for Kansas, so the percentage of LGBTQ and Out LGBTQ lawmakers is omitted.

**5.3 Figure 5.3: Overtime Trends in LGBTQ Lawmakers By Identity Group:
1991-2017**



5.4 Figure 5.4: Out LGBTQ Legislators Who Are Not First Time Seatholders Are Less Effective Lawmakers



Note: Model reported in Table 1 in-text. The model above is estimated with 90% confidence intervals, state and term fixed effects, and standard errors clustered by legislator.

6 Additional Voter Discrimination Mechanism Test

6.1 Voter Discrimination by Party

We argue that if voter discrimination explains LGBTQ lawmakers' effectiveness, Republican LGBTQ lawmakers should be more effective than Democratic LGBTQ lawmakers. Existing scholarship suggests that Republican voters electorally penalize LGBTQ candidates more than Democratic voters (Magni and Reynolds 2021). One implication of this finding is that it is likely much more difficult for a Republican LGBTQ candidate to win an election, in part, due to higher voter discrimination.

To test this, we estimate three OLS regression models with the independent variable being "Out During Election". The dependent variable in the first model is SLES for Out LGBTQ Republicans. The dependent variable in the second model is SLES for Out LGBTQ Democrats. In the final model, we interact Republican with "Out During Election", and the dependent variable is SLES for the full sample.

The results in Table 6.1 suggest that Out Republican lawmakers are more effective (0.824, $p < 0.1$) than Out Democratic lawmakers (0.363, $p < 0.01$). The Republican coefficient is 46% larger than the Democratic coefficient. However, when interacting Republican with "Out During Election", the results are not statistically significant. One challenge with estimating effectiveness by party is the incredibly small number of Out Republican state legislators in our sample. In the first model, where the dependent variable is SLES for Out Republicans, there are only 54 observations. As a result, it is difficult to discern whether the interaction in column 3 is not statistically significant because of the absence of a meaningful relationship or a lack of statistical power. As a result, we interpret these results as suggestive, but they are directionally consistent with our three in-text mechanism tests.

6.1.1 Table 6.1.1: Out Republican LGBTQ Legislators Are More Effective Lawmakers

	Out Republicans (SLES)	Out Democrats (SLES)	SLES
Out During Election	0.824 ⁺ (0.426)	0.363 ^{**} (0.138)	0.372 ^{**} (0.143)
Republican	—	—	-0.049 (0.167)
Out During Election + Republican	—	—	0.370 (0.342)
% Out	-0.055 (0.155)	-0.007 (0.026)	-0.004 (0.025)
Female	0.907 (0.946)	-0.103 (0.116)	-0.104 (0.116)
Black	—	-0.238 (0.281)	-0.294 (0.271)
Hispanic	—	0.127 (0.279)	0.092 (0.274)
White	0.000 (0.000)	0.143 (0.220)	0.090 (0.212)
Seniority	0.182 ⁺ (0.093)	0.058 ⁺ (0.031)	0.072 [*] (0.034)
Committee Chair	2.363 ^{***} (0.581)	0.354 [*] (0.150)	0.374 [*] (0.145)
In Majority Party	-0.272 (0.501)	0.812 ^{***} (0.190)	0.727 ^{***} (0.189)
In Governor's Party	-0.902 (0.536)	0.069 (0.107)	-0.003 (0.108)
In Majority Leadership	1.353 (0.920)	-0.035 (0.295)	-0.092 (0.268)
In Minority Leadership	0.209 (0.932)	-0.100 (0.262)	-0.103 (0.258)
Distance from Median	-0.164 (0.485)	0.005 (0.110)	-0.011 (0.109)
Leader, Speaker, or President	—	-0.169 (0.402)	-0.126 (0.387)
Term Limits	-0.378 (0.633)	0.337 [*] (0.140)	0.332 [*] (0.136)
Professionalism	-0.205 (0.979)	-0.137 (0.370)	-0.168 (0.359)
Vote Share	-1.912 ⁺ (0.980)	-0.238 (0.178)	-0.303 (0.202)
Senate	-0.668 (0.928)	-0.249 [*] (0.111)	-0.263 [*] (0.108)
Intercept	0.242 (1.104)	1.840 ^{***} (0.351)	1.919 ^{***} (0.346)
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓
Term Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓
Observations	54	811	865

Standard errors in parentheses

⁺ $p < 0.1$, ^{*} $p < 0.05$, ^{**} $p < 0.01$, ^{***} $p < 0.001$

7 Robustness Checks: Overperformance Beyond Effective Lawmaking

Voter discrimination should lead LGBTQ lawmakers to overperform in various ways, including but not limited to effective lawmaking. To assess the robustness of our findings, we include three additional measures of overperformance: campaign fundraising, committee chair positions, and bill sponsorship on substantive and significant legislation. Examining fundraising data allows us to test whether LGBTQ candidates overperform in their elections. Our measures of committee chairs and substantive and significant bill sponsorship enables us to assess whether LGBTQ lawmakers overperform once in the legislature. If LGBTQ candidates overperform because voter discrimination requires them to be more experienced and qualified to get elected, they should raise more money, be more likely to chair committees, and introduce more substantive and significant legislation than non-LGBTQ lawmakers.

Indeed, this is what we find. Table 7.1 reports the results from a model estimating the relationship between “LGBTQ” and campaign fundraising. We include four different measures of campaign fundraising (Bonica 2023). First, we include a measure that captures the percentage of total contributions raised in a race. For example, if \$100,000 was raised by all candidates in the race, and \$70,000 was raised by a given lawmaker, that lawmaker’s value for this measure would be 70%. We also calculate the percentage of total contributions from individuals and the percentage of total contributions from PACs in the same way. Finally, we calculate the log of total contributions (raw number rather than percentage). As expected, across all four dependent variables, LGBTQ lawmakers raise more money in their races than non-LGBTQ candidates.

Tables 7.2 and 7.3 report the relationship between LGBTQ lawmakers and committee chairships and bill introductions on substantive and significant legislation. We find that LGBTQ lawmakers are more likely to become committee chairs than non-LGBTQ lawmakers. Moreover, LGBTQ lawmakers introduce more bills overall and introduce more substantive and significant

bills than non-LGBTQ lawmakers (though they do not introduce more or less commemorative bills than non-LGBTQ lawmakers). Across all three of these robustness tests, the results are consistent: LGBTQ lawmakers outperform non-LGBTQ lawmakers.

7.1 Table 7.1: LGBTQ Candidates Raise More Money in Campaigns

	% of Total Contributions	% of Total Contributions from Individuals	% of Total Contributions from PACs	(Log) Sum of Total Contributions
LGBTQ	3.120 [*] (1.335)	5.021 ^{**} (1.707)	3.102 ⁺ (1.672)	0.182 ^{**} (0.067)
% LGBTQ	0.399 ^{**} (0.145)	0.698 ^{***} (0.192)	0.467 ⁺ (0.255)	-0.001 (0.006)
Female	-1.162 ^{**} (0.369)	-0.600 (0.496)	-0.344 (0.461)	-0.061 ^{**} (0.020)
Black	0.642 (1.795)	-0.851 (2.394)	-1.845 (1.931)	-0.171 ⁺ (0.096)
Hispanic	-0.970 (1.668)	-2.584 (2.199)	-3.578 [*] (1.787)	-0.093 (0.087)
White	0.910 (1.475)	-0.378 (1.921)	-0.249 (1.568)	-0.154 [*] (0.077)
Democrat	0.082 (0.321)	3.003 ^{***} (0.424)	-3.219 ^{***} (0.408)	0.019 (0.018)
Seniority	0.784 ^{***}	0.356 ^{***}	1.367 ^{***}	-0.001
Committee Chair	1.900 ^{***} (0.322)	1.564 ^{***} (0.428)	2.683 ^{***} (0.386)	0.048 ^{**} (0.017)
In Majority	-1.364 ^{**} (0.469)	-0.507 (0.605)	-2.555 ^{***} (0.573)	0.074 ^{**} (0.024)
In Governor's Party	1.206 ^{***} (0.277)	1.718 ^{***} (0.364)	-0.432 (0.343)	0.020 (0.014)
In Majority Leadership	3.598 ^{***} (0.717)	4.316 ^{***} (0.898)	3.359 ^{***} (0.818)	0.317 ^{***} (0.039)
In Minority Leadership	4.824 ^{***} (0.698)	6.892 ^{***} (0.901)	5.222 ^{***} (0.848)	0.350 ^{***} (0.041)
Distance from Median	-2.150 ^{***} (0.409)	-1.158 [*] (0.530)	-2.933 ^{***} (0.508)	-0.162 ^{***} (0.021)
Leader, Speaker, or President	0.183 (0.950)	2.499 [*] (1.189)	-1.039 (1.135)	0.202 ^{**} (0.067)
Term Limits	-1.064 (0.931)	-0.978 (1.200)	1.123 (1.083)	0.167 ^{***} (0.046)
Professionalism	1.554 (3.248)	-0.346 (3.752)	5.088 (3.961)	0.442 ^{**} (0.147)
Vote Share	70.033 ^{***} (0.803)	75.489 ^{***} (0.998)	57.589 ^{***} (0.932)	-1.830 ^{***} (0.041)
Incumbency Status	-3.831 ^{***} (0.187)	-4.069 ^{***} (0.225)	-2.248 ^{***} (0.261)	0.036 ^{***} (0.007)
Senate	4.523 ^{***} (0.471)	5.439 ^{***} (0.597)	5.258 ^{***} (0.598)	0.803 ^{***} (0.023)
Intercept	24.179 ^{***} (4.266)	14.076 ^{**} (5.318)	39.099 ^{***} (5.051)	11.636 ^{***} (0.169)
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Term Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
District Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	21420	20968	21209	21405

Standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

7.2 Table 7.2: LGBTQ Legislators Are More Likely to Be Committee Chairs

	Committee Chair
LGBTQ	0.301* (0.153)
% LGBTQ	-0.021+ (0.012)
Female	-0.007 (0.037)
Black	0.276 (0.189)
Hispanic	0.118 (0.180)
White	0.235 (0.160)
Democrat	0.102** (0.037)
Seniority	0.226*** (0.007)
In Majority	2.094*** (0.059)
In Governor's Party	-0.102*** (0.027)
Distance from Median	-0.623*** (0.043)
Leader, Speaker, or President	-0.782*** (0.100)
Term Limits	0.128+ (0.069)
Professionalism	-0.112 (0.356)
Vote Share	0.678*** (0.071)
Senate	1.411*** (0.035)
Intercept	-3.116*** (0.260)
State Fixed Effects	✓
Term Fixed Effects	✓
Observations	73371

Standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

7.3 Table 7.3: LGBTQ Legislators Are More Productive Lawmakers

	All Bills	Substantive & Significant Bills	Substantive Bills	Commemorative Bills
LGBTQ	4.108*** (1.109)	0.229*** (0.062)	4.128*** (1.236)	-0.002 (0.021)
% LGBTQ	-0.318** (0.111)	-0.002 (0.006)	-0.128 (0.121)	-0.004* (0.002)
Female	-1.830*** (0.289)	-0.001 (0.016)	-1.905*** (0.325)	-0.035*** (0.006)
Black	2.126 (1.517)	-0.010 (0.083)	-0.666 (1.643)	-0.026 (0.028)
Hispanic	1.688 (1.473)	-0.216** (0.080)	-1.317 (1.584)	-0.033 (0.027)
White	4.982*** (1.312)	0.050 (0.071)	1.989 (1.411)	-0.022 (0.024)
Democrat	-2.019*** (0.254)	0.054*** (0.015)	-2.380*** (0.288)	0.010* (0.005)
Seniority	0.975*** (0.042)	0.013*** (0.002)	1.053*** (0.047)	-0.001+ (0.001)
Committee Chair	7.450*** (0.313)	0.456*** (0.017)	6.608*** (0.345)	0.053*** (0.006)
In Majority	5.730*** (0.378)	0.306*** (0.022)	6.037*** (0.438)	-0.000 (0.007)
In Governor's Party	0.099 (0.250)	0.053*** (0.014)	-0.012 (0.285)	-0.022*** (0.005)
In Majority Leadership	1.129 (0.722)	0.311*** (0.039)	0.704 (0.774)	-0.001 (0.013)
In Minority Leadership	0.754 (0.713)	0.014 (0.039)	1.143 (0.768)	-0.016 (0.013)
Distance from Median	1.283*** (0.314)	0.007 (0.018)	1.321*** (0.354)	-0.001 (0.006)
Leader, Speaker, or President1	9.173*** (0.980)	0.380*** (0.053)	9.726*** (1.055)	0.033+ (0.018)
Term Limits	2.437*** (0.662)	0.369*** (0.041)	2.604** (0.807)	0.011 (0.014)
Professionalism	-7.208* (3.623)	0.508* (0.207)	-3.929 (4.101)	-0.178* (0.070)
Vote Share	-1.107+ (0.625)	0.088* (0.037)	-1.178 (0.725)	-0.057*** (0.012)
Senate	13.427*** (0.287)	0.460*** (0.016)	12.256*** (0.312)	0.109*** (0.005)
Intercept	-4.312+ (2.474)	0.714*** (0.121)	-4.685+ (2.406)	0.300*** (0.041)
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Term Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	73371	62625	62625	62625

Standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

8 Potential Competing Mechanism: Is it selection or survival?

Our theory posits that voter discrimination results in only the most qualified and experienced LGBTQ candidates winning elections. As a result, LGBTQ lawmakers will be more effective than non-LGBTQ lawmakers. We refer to this mechanism as “selection.” A competing explanation that could explain our results is that LGBTQ legislators may combat discrimination from voters in their upcoming election cycle ($t + 1$) by engaging in effective lawmaking in legislative term, t , a mechanism we refer to as “survival.” To disentangle these potential explanatory mechanisms, we regress a lawmaker’s SLES onto their upcoming vote share. If lawmakers engage in effective lawmaking to win votes in their upcoming election (i.e., survival), effective lawmakers should have a higher vote share than less effective lawmakers. As shown in Table 8.1, this modeling strategy renders results that suggest lawmakers’ effectiveness is unrelated to their leading vote share. Legislators’ effectiveness is also unrelated to the vote share in their upcoming election when we model LGBTQ and non-LGBTQ lawmakers separately. As a result, this suggests that survival is likely not the mechanism explaining our findings.

8.1 Table 8.1: LGBTQ Legislators' Effectiveness Does Not Predict Vote Share in the Following Election

	Full Sample (Leading Vote Share)	Full Sample (Leading Vote Share)	Non-LGBTQ (Leading Vote Share)	LGBTQ (Leading Vote Share)
SLES	-0.0001 (0.001)	0.0002 (0.001)	0.00005 (0.001)	-0.011 (0.009)
LGBTQ	0.048*** (0.011)	0.048*** (0.011)	—	—
% LGBTQ	-0.005*** (0.001)	-0.006*** (0.001)	-0.005*** (0.001)	-0.012 (0.008)
Female	-0.006* (0.003)	-0.006+ (0.003)	-0.006+ (0.003)	-0.063+ (0.027)
Black	0.027+ (0.015)	0.020 (0.015)	0.027+ (0.015)	-0.020 (0.106)
Hispanic	0.029* (0.015)	0.028+ (0.014)	0.027+ (0.015)	0.013 (0.057)
White	-0.004 (0.013)	-0.007 (0.013)	-0.004 (0.013)	-0.101** (0.033)
Democrat	-0.007** (0.003)	-0.008** (0.003)	-0.007+ (0.003)	-0.086+ (0.034)
Seniority	0.004*** (0.000)	0.004*** (0.000)	0.004*** (0.000)	0.008+ (0.004)
Committee Chair	0.015*** (0.003)	0.016*** (0.003)	0.015*** (0.003)	0.015 (0.024)
In Majority	0.004 (0.004)	0.004 (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)	0.072+ (0.031)
In Governor's Party	0.006** (0.002)	0.006** (0.002)	0.006** (0.002)	-0.008 (0.022)
In Majority Leadership	0.018** (0.006)	0.021** (0.006)	0.019** (0.006)	-0.055 (0.043)
In Minority Leadership	0.017** (0.006)	0.020*** (0.006)	0.017** (0.006)	0.009 (0.051)
Distance from Median	0.030*** (0.003)	0.029*** (0.003)	0.029*** (0.003)	0.086*** (0.026)
Leader, Speaker, or President	-0.005 (0.009)	-0.006 (0.009)	-0.005 (0.009)	-0.035 (0.055)
Term Limits	0.021*** (0.006)	0.023*** (0.006)	0.020*** (0.006)	0.097 (0.074)
Professionalism	0.074** (0.027)	0.078** (0.027)	0.071** (0.027)	0.249 (0.160)
Senate	0.007* (0.003)	0.027*** (0.004)	0.007+ (0.003)	0.022 (0.030)
Intercept	0.697*** (0.021)	0.745*** (0.024)	0.698*** (0.021)	1.089*** (0.075)
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Term Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
District Fixed Effects		✓		
Observations	53996	53317	53352	644


Standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

9 Transformation of the Dependent Variable

The distribution of SLES is skewed rightward, indicating numerous outliers at the upper end of the distribution. Given that outliers could bias our findings, we normalize the dependent variable by z-scoring SLES. Figure 5.1 displays a histogram of both the SLES variable and the transformed z-scored SLES. To guard against the possibility of outliers misrepresenting our specified model, we run all of our analyses using the original SLES variable and a z-scored transformation of the SLES variable. As the tables in section five of the appendix show, our findings are not sensitive to the transformed dependent variable. We choose to report results of our regressions using the normalized SLES variable in-text.

9.1 Figure 9.1: Distribution of SLES and Z-Scored SLES



9.2 Table 9.2: Transformation of the Dependent Variable: LGBTQ Legislators Are More Effective Lawmakers

	BILL	AIC	ABC	PASS	LAW	SLES
LGBTQ	0.001*	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.227***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.068)
% LGBTQ	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.010**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.004)
Female	-0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000 ⁺	0.000*	-0.027 ⁺
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.015)
Black	-0.005*	-0.006*	-0.006*	-0.006*	-0.006 ⁺	-0.023
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.135)
Hispanic	-0.003	-0.004 ⁺	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004	0.022
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.132)
Race (Other)	-0.005*	-0.005 ⁺	-0.006*	-0.008**	-0.008*	-0.107
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.145)
White	-0.004 ⁺	-0.005 ⁺	-0.004 ⁺	-0.005	-0.005	0.072
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.130)
Democrat	-0.001**	0.000	0.000	0.000*	0.001*	0.044***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.013)
Seniority	0.000*	0.000 ⁺	0.000 ⁺	0.000*	0.000*	0.036***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.005)
Committee Chair	0.006***	0.008***	0.008***	0.009***	0.009***	0.488***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.022)
In Majority Party	0.002***	0.004***	0.004***	0.004***	0.004***	0.381***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.023)
In Governor's Party	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***	0.048***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.010)
In Majority Leadership	0.003***	0.004***	0.005***	0.006***	0.006***	0.118***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.031)
In Minority Leadership	0.002***	0.001 ⁺	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.112*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.045)
Distance from Median	-0.000	-0.001***	-0.002***	-0.002***	-0.003***	-0.074***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.021)
Leader, Speaker, or President	0.002	0.003 ⁺	0.004*	0.004*	0.005*	0.178
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.118)
Term Limits	0.002***	0.002***	0.002***	0.002***	0.002***	0.105***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.014)
Professionalism	-0.005***	-0.005***	-0.005***	-0.005***	-0.005***	-0.202***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.054)
Vote Share	0.002***	0.001***	0.002***	0.002***	0.002***	-0.017
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.033)
Senate	0.015***	0.014***	0.014***	0.014***	0.014***	-0.168***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.016)
Intercept	0.008***	0.007**	0.006*	0.006*	0.006 ⁺	0.482***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.144)
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Term Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	73483	73483	73483	73483	73483	73483

Standard errors in parentheses

⁺ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

9.3 Table 9.3: Transformation of the Dependent Variable: Out Legislators

Are More Effective Lawmakers

	BILL	AIC	ABC	PASS	LAW	SLES
Out During Election	-0.005 ⁺ (0.003)	0.000 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.304 [*] (0.146)
% Out	0.001 ⁺ (0.000)	0.001 (0.000)	0.001 (0.000)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.021)
Female	0.000 (0.001)	0.002 (0.001)	0.002 (0.001)	0.002 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.125 (0.113)
Black	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.009 ⁺ (0.005)	-0.008 (0.005)	-0.012 [*] (0.005)	-0.016 ^{**} (0.006)	-0.443 (0.311)
Hispanic	0.001 (0.005)	-0.006 (0.005)	-0.005 (0.005)	-0.010 ⁺ (0.005)	-0.011 [*] (0.006)	0.005 (0.251)
White	0.000 (0.004)	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.009 [*] (0.004)	-0.010 [*] (0.005)	0.008 (0.212)
Democrat	0.002 (0.004)	0.003 (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.430 (0.326)
Seniority	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.095 [*] (0.041)
Committee Chair	0.004 ⁺ (0.002)	0.007 ^{**} (0.002)	0.007 ^{***} (0.002)	0.006 ^{**} (0.002)	0.006 ^{**} (0.002)	0.347 [*] (0.149)
In Majority Party	0.005 ^{**} (0.002)	0.008 ^{***} (0.002)	0.009 ^{***} (0.002)	0.010 ^{***} (0.002)	0.010 ^{***} (0.002)	0.557 ^{**} (0.168)
In Governor's Party	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.038 (0.114)
In Majority Leadership	0.004 (0.004)	0.006 (0.005)	0.006 (0.005)	0.009 (0.006)	0.008 (0.006)	-0.214 (0.242)
In Minority Leadership	-0.002 (0.003)	0.000 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	-0.000 (0.003)	0.000 (0.003)	0.002 (0.260)
Distance from Median	0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.038 (0.101)
Leader, Speaker, or President	-0.009 ⁺ (0.005)	-0.007 (0.005)	-0.005 (0.006)	-0.004 (0.007)	-0.003 (0.008)	-0.097 (0.318)
Term Limits	0.005 ^{**} (0.002)	0.005 ^{**} (0.002)	0.005 ^{**} (0.002)	0.006 ^{**} (0.002)	0.006 ^{**} (0.002)	0.234 ⁺ (0.134)
Professionalism	-0.010 ⁺ (0.005)	-0.015 ^{**} (0.005)	-0.014 ^{**} (0.005)	-0.010 ⁺ (0.005)	-0.010 ⁺ (0.005)	-0.879 ^{**} (0.330)
Vote Share	0.004 (0.003)	0.002 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	-0.387 (0.248)
Senate	0.014 ^{***} (0.002)	0.013 ^{***} (0.002)	0.011 ^{***} (0.002)	0.011 ^{***} (0.002)	0.011 ^{***} (0.002)	-0.231 [*] (0.102)
Intercept	0.002 (0.005)	0.011 ^{**} (0.004)	0.009 [*] (0.004)	0.016 ^{**} (0.005)	0.020 ^{***} (0.005)	3.846 ^{***} (0.354)
State Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Term Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	865	865	865	865	865	865

Standard errors in parentheses

⁺ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$